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Abstract. We study the asymptotic macroscopic properties of the mixed
majority-minority game, modeling a population in which two types of hetero-
geneous adaptive agents, namely “fundamentalists” driven by differentiation and
“trend-followers” driven by imitation, interact. The presence of a fraction f of
trend-followers is shown to induce (a) a significant loss of informational efficiency
with respect to a pure minority game (in particular, an efficient, unpredictable
phase exists only for f < 1/2), and (b) a catastrophic increase of global fluctua-
tions for f > 1/2. We solve the model by means of an approximate static (replica)
theory and by a direct dynamical (generating functional) technique. The two ap-
proaches coincide and match numerical results convincingly.
1. Introduction
In recent years, a substantial amount of research has been focused on model systems
of heterogeneous adaptive agents interacting competitively, as e.g. in games, markets
or ecosystems, in the attempt to understand the mechanisms by which real systems
create exploitable information, and to clarify the origin of their complex collective
behavior [1]. The minority game, with its several variants, is perhaps the most studied
of such models [2]. In its simplest version, it describes a population of boundedly
rational players with fully heterogeneous beliefs who, at each round of the game,
make their strategic decisions basing on some public information pattern (the “state
of the world”) aiming to be in the minority group. The minority-wins mechanism,
which serves the purpose of modeling competition for a scarce resource, translates
into a strong assumption on the behavioral traits and expectations of players. Indeed,
it turns out that in order to maximize their expected utilities under the minority-wins
rule, agents have to enhance their initial heterogeneity and differentiate themselves
as much as possible from each other. This is rather intuitive: if agents would learn
to make decisions similarly to each other, being in a minority would become a rather
unlikely event. On the other hand, one might also consider another tendency that is
often encountered in real agents, namely that toward imitation, say of an agent who
believes that his/her payoff is maximized when he/she acts according to the majority.
In this paper, we consider a mixed majority-minority game, to study the effects of
competition in a population formed by two types of players, i.e. those whose short-
term behavior is driven by imitation (who play a majority game), and those who are
instead anti-imitative (and play a minority game).
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From the viewpoint of economic modeling, our system represents a simple
abstraction for a market where two classes of economic agents, namely
“fundamentalists” and “trend-followers”, interact. The former – see [3, 4] for details
– create their expectations under the assumption that the market price is close to
its “fundamental” value, i.e. to a stationary equilibrium, and correspond to minority
game players. The latter, instead, extrapolate a trend from recent price increments
and assume that the next increment will occur in the direction of the trend (see
also [5,6]); they correspond to majority game players. In real markets, fundamentalists
act as a kind of elastic force that pulls the price toward its fundamental value, while
trend-followers destabilize the market by driving the price away from it. They are in
particular widely believed to be the main actors in the infamous buy rushes known
as “bubbles”. Understandably then, modeling the interplay between trend-followers
and fundamentalists is a basic issue in the theory of markets, and several models
have been proposed (see e.g. [5–8] and references therein). In most cases, however,
insight can be gained only from numerical simulations due to the complexity of the
microscopic definitions. The mixed model we consider here has the advantage of being
simple enough to be analytically tractable via the methods of statistical mechanics,
notwithstanding its phenomenological richness. The effects due to the presence of
trend-followers are fully discernible and an interpretation in market terms is quite
straightforward‡. Besides, the majority game is an interesting model in itself, that
from the theoretical viewpoint shares some features with the Hopfield model [10].
Surprisingly, it has not received much attention so far [11, 12].
This work is organized as follows. The basic definitions of the model are given in
Sec. 2, together with an outline of the results. The static approximation to the analysis
of the asymptotic macroscopic properties is expounded in Sec. 3. It is based on the
formal analogy with zero-temperature spin glasses first derived in [13] for the pure
minority game, whose stationary states were shown to be (approximately) given by
the minima of a random Hamiltonian. In our case, the resulting optimization problem
is slightly more subtle and its solution requires a negative dimensional replica theory of
the kind already used for “minimax games” [14], close in spirit to the method of partial
annealing [15]. Sec. 4 is devoted to the dynamical solution of the “batch” version of the
model, which is carried out employing the generating functional technique [16] along
the lines of [17, 18]. Some details about this calculation are given in the Appendix.
Finally, in Sec. 5, we formulate our conclusions.
2. Definitions and outline of the results
The setup we consider is as follows. There are N players and P possible information
patterns. For each player i ∈ {1, . . . , N} two strategies aig : {1, . . . , P} ∋ µ → aµig ∈
{−1,+1} are given (g = 1, 2) that map an information pattern µ into a binary trading
action aµig (‘buy/sell’). (The generalization to S strategies per agent is possible but
it is analytically less convenient.) We assume as usual that P scales with N so that
P/N = α remains finite in the relevant limit N → ∞ and that each aµig is selected
randomly with uniform probability in {−1, 1} at the beginning of the game for all i, µ
and g and fixed. Strategies are evaluated according to their “performance” pig(n).
At each round n, players receive an information pattern µ(n) chosen at random
‡ For another minority-game based market model with two different types of agents, “speculators”
and “producers”, see [9].
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with uniform probability in {1, . . . , P} [19, 20]. Subsequently, each player picks his
so-far best-performing strategy, g˜i(n) = arg maxg pig(n), and formulates the bid it
prescribes, i.e. a
µ(n)
ig˜i(n)
. The aggregate action of all players at round n (in economic
terms, the “excess demand”) is just
A(n) =
1√
N
∑
i=1,N
a
µ(n)
ig˜i(n)
(1)
Once A(n) is known, majority (resp. minority) game players reward their strategies
for which a
µ(n)
ig A(n) > 0 (resp. a
µ(n)
ig A(n) < 0). Hence the performance updating or
learning process takes place according to§
pig(n+ 1)− pig(n) = ǫiaµ(n)ig A(n) (g = 1, 2) (2)
where ǫi = −1 for minority game players and ǫi = +1 for majority game players, and
the game moves into the next round. The ǫi’s can be seen as an additional family
of quenched r.v.’s (besides the aµig’s) with probability density P (ǫi) = fδǫi,+1 + (1 −
f)δǫi,−1.
For later use, it is convenient to introduce the “preferences” yi(n) = (pi1(n) −
pi2(n))/2 and the quantities ξ
µ
i = (a
µ
i1 − aµi2)/2, ωµi = (aµi1 + aµi2)/2 and Ωµ =
N−1/2
∑
i=1,N ω
µ
i , using which (2) can be recast as an equation for yi(n):
yi(n+ 1)− yi(n) = ǫiξµ(n)i [Ωµ(n) +
1√
N
∑
j=1,N
ξ
µ(n)
j sj(n)] (3)
where si(n) = sign[yi(n)]. When yi(n) > 0 (resp. yi(n) < 0) agent i selects strategy
g = 1 (resp. g = 2) and si(n) = +1 (resp. si(n) = −1). As in the pure minority
game, this stochastic (indeed, Markovian) dynamics is a zero-temperature process that
violates detailed balance so that, strictly speaking, no equilibrium state exists.
As usual, one is interested in characterizing the macroscopic properties of the
stationary state (if any exists) of (3). Two quantities have been introduced to this
aim. As a measure of global efficiency one uses the “volatility”
σ2 =
〈
A2
〉
= lim
T→∞
1
T − Teq
∑
n=Teq,T
A(n)2 (4)
that is, the magnitude of market fluctuations (〈A〉 = 0 by construction). Intuitively,
efficiency is higher the smaller is σ2. As a reference value, it is reasonable to take
σ2 = 1, which corresponds to “random players” who at each round randomize
uniformly between the two possible actions. When σ2 < 1 one can say that agents
are, to some degree, cooperating. From the viewpoint of information creation, the
relevant quantity is instead the “predictability” or “available information”
H =
1
P
∑
µ=1,P
〈A|µ〉2 with 〈A|ν〉 = lim
T→∞
1
T − Teq
∑
n=Teq,T
A(n)δµ(n),ν (5)
whose meaning is discussed at length in the literature (see e.g. [21, 22]). The idea
is that when H > 0 there exists at least one state of the world, say µ, such that
〈A|µ〉 6= 0, i.e. for which there is an action that is more likely to be the winning
action. An external agent entering the game could hence exploit this information to
have a gain. The fact that H > 0 signals an inefficiency of the market. Regimes with
§ We assume that players ignore their market impact, i.e. that they behave as price takers [21].
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Figure 1. Behavior of σ2 and H vs α for f = 0, 0.25, 0.75, 1. Markers represent
results from numerical simulations with homogeneous initial conditions, averaged
over 200 disorder samples. The dashed vertical lines give the location of αc
(from theory). Continuous lines represent analytical approximations (valid only
for α > αc). Results for H are compared with the static approximation of Sec.
3, while those for σ2 are compared with the dynamical results of Sec. 4. The
logarithmic scale on the y-axis in the upper panels has been used to stress the
dependence of σ2 on the initial conditions for α < αc. In the lower panels, the
upper curves correspond in both figures to the static results for H.
H > 0 are dubbed ‘asymmetric’, at odds with ‘symmetric’ ones with H = 0 where the
game’s outcome is not predictable.
In the limit N →∞, σ2 and H depend on α (as in the pure minority game) and f .
Computer simulations of (3) suggest the following scenario (see Fig. 1). For f < 1/2,
a minority-game type of behavior is recovered, with an asymmetric phase (H > 0) at
high α separated by a symmetric one (H = 0) at low α. The transition point‖ αc
‖ We remind that strictly speaking this is not an equilibrium phase transition since (3) violates
detailed balance.
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decreases as f increases, hence the symmetric phase shrinks as more and more trend-
followers join the game, indicating that they provide an additional exploitable ‘signal’.
Market fluctuations tend to the random limit σ2 = 1 for large α and decrease with
α until the critical point is reached. In the sub-critical phase, the stationary state
depends strongly on the initial conditions of (3), and both high-volatility and low-
volatility states can be reached starting from slightly different configurations¶. For
f > 1/2, instead, trend-followers dominate the game and the global efficiency decreases
steadily with α and f . The market is asymmetric (H > 0) for all α and the difference
between σ2 and H diminishes as f increases. For f = 1, one has σ2 = H . The
dependence of σ2 on the initial conditions is arguably very weak (obviously provided
initial conditions are not too biased). The case f = 1/2 possesses some special features
and will be treated separately [23].
In order to get some theoretical insight, one can follow the line of reasoning
adopted for the pure minority game, for which it was shown by constructing the
continuous-time limit of (3) that the average asymptotic value of si, denoted by mi,
can be obtained by minimizing the random function
H(m) = N
P
∑
µ=1,P
[Ωµ +
1√
N
∑
i=1,N
ξµi mi]
2 (6)
where m = {mi}. (Notice that the mi’s are ‘soft’ spin: −1 ≤ mi ≤ 1.) We will not
discuss here the limitations of this approximation and refer the reader to the original
literature [13,24–29] for a critical discussion. In the limit N →∞, this problem could
be tackled using spin-glass techniques, because
lim
N→∞
min
m
H(m)
N
= − lim
β→∞
lim
N→∞
1
βN
logZ(β) (7)
(here, Z(β) =
∫
e−βHdm and the over-line denotes an average over disorder). The
evaluation of logZ requires the replica trick [30]. For α > αc, H has a unique
minimum, hence the stationary state can be fully described by the replica-symmetric
solution of (7).
This argument can be easily reformulated for the pure majority game. The
corresponding optimization problem turns out to be
max
m
H(m) or, equivalently, min
m
−H(m) (8)
A few comments are in order. First, it is easy to see that H = H/N , which implies
that minority game players roughly tend to minimize the available information, while
majority ones tend to maximize it. Second, at odds with H, −H possesses many
minima, hence the stationary state of the majority game will always depend on the
initial conditions of the dynamics (even though the macroscopic observables σ2 and
H might take on the same or very similar values in all minima). Basing on well-
known properties of the Hopfield model [10], one expects the true minima of −H to
be described by solutions of (8) that break replica symmetry. Moreover, as happens in
attractor neural networks with extensively many patterns, a “retrieval” phase is to be
expected for small enough α where, due to correlations between the initial conditions
and one specific pattern, say µ = 1, the overlap oµ(m) = N−1/2
∑
i=1,N ξ
µ
i mi is
O(N−1/2), and vanishing as N → ∞, for all µ’s except µ = 1, for which it is finite.
¶ Clearly, if the initial conditions yi(0) contain a sufficiently large bias toward one of the strategies,
all players will always use the same strategy, which will evidently result in the ‘random trading’ state
with σ2 = 1.
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The fact that agents can ‘condense’ around a given pattern implies that every time
that pattern is presented to them a buy (or sell) rush takes place. Solving (8) is hence
a non-trivial task in itself, and requires a detailed study [12].
Generalizing to our case, one finds that the stationarymi’s for the mixed majority-
minority model can be obtained by solving the following problem:
max
m2
min
m1
H(m1,m2) (9)
where m1 (resp. m2) denote collective the mi variables of minority (resp. majority)
game players+. Hence the mixed game where both minority and majority players
are present at the same time requires a minimization of H in certain directions
(the minority ones) and a maximization in others (the majority ones). Again, this
problem can be tackled by a replica theory. The idea [14] is to introduce two ‘inverse
temperatures’ β1 and β2 for minority and majority players respectively, such that
max
m2
min
m1
H(m1,m2) = lim
β1,β2→∞
1
β2
logZ(β1, β2) (10)
with the following generalized partition function:
Z(β1, β2) =
∫
dm2 e
β2
[
− 1
β1
log
∫
dm1 e
−β1H
]
=
∫
dm2
[∫
dm1 e
−β1H
]−γ
(11)
where γ = β2/β1 > 0. In physical jargon, this describes a system where: first, the
m1 variables are thermalized at a positive temperature 1/β1 with Hamiltonian H at
fixed m2; then, the m2 variables are thermalized at a negative temperature −1/β2
with an effective Hamiltonian Heff defined by −β1Heff(m2) = log
∫
dm1 e
−β1H. The
disorder average can be carried out with the help of a ‘nested’ replica trick. First, one
replicates the minority variables by treating the exponent −γ as a positive integer R
(in the end, the limit R→ −γ < 0 must be taken). (11) thus becomes
Z =
∫
dm2
[∫
dm1 e
−β1H
]R
=
∫
dm2
∫ e−β1∑r H({mr1},m2) ∏
r=1,R
dmr1
 (12)
Then a second replication is needed∗, this time on the m2 variables:
Zn =
∫
e−β1
∑
a,r H({mar1 },{ma2})
∏
a=1,n
∏
r=1,R
dmar1 dm
a
2 (13)
At this point we have two replica indexes with different roles: the a replicas have been
introduced to deal with the disorder, and their number n will eventually go to zero,
as usual; the r replicas have been introduced to deal with the negative temperature,
and their number R must be set to a negative value♯. Majority variables bear just one
index, while minority ones have two. We can interpret this fact by saying that ma2
indicates a particular configuration of the majority variables, i.e. a given manifold
in the whole m space; and mar1 indicates the minority coordinates in that particular
manifold.
+ Notice that the min and max operations can be interchanged. In general, this leads to different
solutions. In our case, however, one can verify that the main results would not change, though the
intermediate steps (e.g. the definition of γ) would vary
∗ We remind the reader that replica theories use the fact that logZ = limn→0(1/n) log Zn.
♯ This kind of limit is not completely new in replica theories; this is what is usually done for example
to express determinants via a bosonic integral representation, see for instance [31] for a discussion
and [32] for an application.
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In Sec. 3 we will solve (10) in the limit N → ∞ using (13) as a starting point.
Evidently, retrieval solutions for the majority part become increasingly important as
f gets bigger. We will however neglect this aspect (which in the mixed case leads
to a serious lengthening). Results obtained in this way give a very good agreement
with numerical simulations, suggesting that retrieval doesn’t substantially affect the
average macroscopic properties of the game. Of course, it is expected to play a very
important role for phenomena that are local in time (like “bubbles”). Besides this
static approximation, we will also tackle the dynamics (3) straightforwardly, resorting
to the generating-functional method to carry out the disorder-average. Again, we will
neglect the possibility of retrieval. Following [17], we will focus on the ‘batch’ version
of the model. Dynamical results obtained in this way turn out to coincide nicely with
their static counterpart and suggest that the transition occurring at αc for f < 1/2 is
related essentially to the onset of anomalous response, as in the pure minority game.
We will calculate the critical line αc(f), showing that αc ↓ 0 as f ↑ 1/2. For f > 1/2,
the response is always finite and the macroscopic properties are dominated by the
contribution of trend followers.
3. Statics
To begin, let us re-write the Hamiltonian (6) as
H(m1,m2) = 1
P
∑
µ=1,P
 ∑
i=1,N
ωµi +
∑
j∈N1
ξµj m1j +
∑
k∈N2
ξµkm2k
2 (14)
where N1 (resp. N2) denotes both the set and the cardinality of the set of minority
(resp. majority) game players. The replicated Hamiltonian entering (13) is
H({mar1 }, {ma2}) =
1
P
∑
µ=1,P
 ∑
i=1,N
ωµi +
∑
j∈N1
ξµjm
ar
1j +
∑
k∈N2
ξµkm
a
2k
2 (15)
We can as usual linearize the exponential in (13) via a Hubbard-Stratonovich
transformation introducing some auxiliary Gaussian variables zµar. Subsequently, the
average over the disorder can be easily performed using the distribution P (aµig) =
1/2(δaµig,1 + δa
µ
ig ,−1) (g = 1, 2) and the definitions of ω
µ
i and ξ
µ
i . One obtains
Zn =
∫
[
∏
a,r
dmar1 dm
a
2 ][
∏
µ,a,r
dzµar√
2π
] e−
∑
µ
∑
ar
(z
µ
ar)
2
2 × (16)
×e−
β1
2α
∑
µ
∑
abrs z
µ
arz
µ
bs
(1+(1−f) 1
N1
∑
j∈N1
mar1jm
bs
1j+f
1
N2
∑
k∈N2
ma2km
b
2k)
It is now convenient to define the overlaps
Qar,bs =
1
N1
∑
j∈N1
mar1jm
bs
1j and Pab =
1
N2
∑
k∈N2
ma2km
b
2k (17)
inserting them in (16) via δ-distributions with Lagrange multipliers Q̂ab,rs and P̂ab.
Notice that the overlap matrices Q and P are nR-dimensional and n-dimensional,
respectively. In this way the site dependence can be easily dealt with, so that after a
little algebra one gets (all numerical factors are ‘hidden’ in the D(·, ·) shorthand):
Zn =
∫
eNS(Q,Q̂,P,P̂) D(Q, Q̂)D(P, P̂) (18)
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where the effective action S is given by (a, b = 1, . . . , nR ; r, s = 1, . . . , R)
S(Q, Q̂,P, P̂) = −α
2
log detT− i [(1− f)Tr(Q̂Q) + f Tr(P̂P)] +
+(1− f) log
∫ +1
−1
[
∏
a,r
dma,r1 ] e
i
∑
abrsm
ar
1 Q̂ar,bsm
bs
1 + f log
∫ +1
−1
[
∏
a
dma2 ] e
i
∑
abm
a
2 P̂abm
b
2
with
T = InR +
β1
α
[EnR + (1− f)Q+ fP⊗ ER] (19)
IK stands for the K × K identity matrix while EK denotes the K × K matrix with
all elements equal to 1. ⊗ is the Kronecker product. In (19) one can easily recognize
some parts coming from the minority agents (those proportional to (1−f)) and others
coming from the majority agents. These contributions are not factorized (in that event,
the mixed problem would be trivial) but are interconnected via the determinant of T.
To proceed further, one has to formulate Ansa¨tze for the overlap matrices and
then perform the integral (18) in the limit N → ∞ by the steepest descent method.
Let us first arrange Q in a convenient matrix form. We choose to order the indexes in
such a way that each row is characterized by a couple (a, r); along the row, the index
a is first kept fixed while r varies from 1 to R. Q is thus naturally subdivided in blocks
of size R × R, the blocks along the diagonal corresponding to a given value of a = b.
We remind that keeping a fixed corresponds to selecting, in the global configuration
space, a well defined manifold with m2 = m
a
2 inside which H is minimized with
respect to the m1 variables. Qar,as can be thus interpreted as the overlap between
two configurations of the same constrained minority problem. It is natural to assume
for these diagonal sub-blocks the same matrix structure of a pure minority game, that
is a symmetric form with a diagonal element Q and an off-diagonal one q1. On the
other hand, elements of the type Qar,bs with a 6= b correspond to overlaps between
two minority configurations in different majority manifolds, and the simplest choice
one can make is to take Qar,bs = q0 for all of them. In this way Q assumes what is
called a 1-step RSB (replica symmetry broken) form [30]:
Qar,bs = (Q− q1)δabδrs + (q1 − q0)ǫarbs + q0 (20)
where the tensor ǫarbs is equal to 1 in the diagonal R × R blocks with a = b, and 0
elsewhere. Notice that, contrary to standard replica calculations, here the block size
R is not a variational parameter, but its value is fixed by the nature of the problem.
For consistency, we adopt the same Ansatz for the conjugated matrix Q̂. The choice
for the n × n matrices P and P̂ is on the other hand more straightforward: we will
consider the simple replica-symmetric Ansatz
Pab = (P − p0)δab + p0 (21)
and take an analogous form for P̂.
Putting (20) and (21) into (19), and using the conventional re-scalings Q̂ =
(−iβ21α/2)Ω and P̂ = (−iβ21α/2)G, the ‘free energy’ density F = −S/(β1n) turns
out to be given, in the limit n→ 0, by
F =
αR
2β1
log
[
1 + (1− f)β1
α
(Q − q1)
]
+
β1Rα(1− f)
2
[ΩQ+ (R− 1)ω1q1 −Rω0q0] +
+
α
2β1
log
[
1 +Rβ1
(1− f)(q1 − q0) + f (P − p0)
α+ (1− f)β1(Q − q1)
]
+
β1α
2
f(GP − g0p0) +
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+
αR
2
1 + (1− f)q0 + fp0
[α+ (1− f)β1(Q− q1)] [Rβ1(1− f)(q1 − q0) + f(P − p0)] + (22)
−1− f
β1
∫
dzP(z) log
∫
dyP(y)
[∫ 1
−1
dm1 e
−β1Vzy(m1)
]R
+
− f
β1
∫
dzP(z) log
∫ 1
−1
dm2 e
−β1Vz(m2)
where P(x) = e−x2/2/√2π and
Vzy(m1) = −z√αω0ym1
√
α(ω1 − ω0)− αβ1
2
(Ω− ω1)m21 (23)
Vz(m2) = −√αg0zm2 − αβ1
2
(G− g0)m22 (24)
The replica recipe now prescribes an extremization of (22) with respect to its
ten variational parameters (namely Q, q0, q1, P , p0 and their conjugate variables),
because when N →∞ it is easy to see that
lim
N→∞
max
m2
min
m1
H
N
= lim
β1,β2→∞
F (saddle point)
R
(25)
This leaves us with a set of ten equations in ten variables. Defining
χ1 =
β1
α
(Q− q1)− β2
α
(q1 − q0) (26)
χ2 =
β2
α
(P − p0) (27)
χ = (1− f)χ1 − fχ2 (28)
and using the shorthands
〈〈· · ·〉〉 =
∫
dzP(z)
∫ dyP(y)
[
QR−1 ∫ 1−1 dm1 · · · e−β1Vyz(m1)]∫
dyP(y) [QR]
 (29)
Q = ∫ 1−1 dm1 e−β1Vyz(m1) being a normalization integral, and
〈· · ·〉2 =
∫ 1
−1 dm2 · · · e−β1Vz(m2)∫ 1
−1 dm2 e
−β1Vz(m2)
(30)
we find the following system:
Q =
〈〈
m21
〉〉
(31)
β1Rq1 + β1(Q− q1) = 〈〈ym1〉〉√
α(ω1 − ω0)
(32)
αχ1 =
〈〈zm1〉〉√
αω0
(33)
β1(Ω− ω1) = − 1
α+ β1(1 − f)(Q− q1) (34)
ω1 − ω0 = (1− f)(q1 − q0) + f(P − p0)
α(1 + χ)[α+ β1(1− f)(Q − q1)] (35)
ω0 =
1 + (1− f)q0 + fp0
α2(1 + χ)2
(36)
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P =
〈
m22
〉
2
(37)
g0 = R
2ω0 (38)
αχ2 = −R 〈zm2〉2√
αg0
(39)
β1(G− g0) = − R
α(1 + χ)
(40)
Some observations about these equations are in order. First, if we set f = 0 we
recover exactly the saddle point equations for a pure minority game problem at inverse
temperature β1. For what concerns the χ’s, it will soon become clear that χ1 is the
susceptibility of minority agents and, when f = 0, it reproduces the susceptibility
of a pure minority game, while χ2 is the susceptibility of majority agents. On the
other hand, χ is evidently not the global susceptibility. This is a consequence of the
fact that to treat minority and majority players within the same formalism we had to
introduce the effective negative inverse temperature −β2.
Solving the above system at finite temperature(s) is a quite difficult task.
Fortunately, in this case we are only interested in the limit of zero temperature(s),
in which the solution of (31–40) turn out not to depend explicitly on R, provided G
and g0 are rescaled by R
2. Specifically, we look for solutions with q0 → q1 → Q and
p0 → P = 1 such that χ1, χ2 and χ remain finite. These assumptions are justified
for minority variables by the existence of just one global minimum of H (which also
means that the minimum is unique in each manifold with given m2). On the other
hand, they are more questionable for majority variables, since the maxima of H are
numerous and disconnected (they occur evidently in the corner of the configuration
space [−1, 1]N). However, they are the simplest possible in absence of retrieval states.
We will adopt them for this reason, but it should be kept in mind that they may not
be the most appropriate ones in general.
After some algebra, the set of saddle point equations can be greatly simplified,
because, as in [21], when β1, β2 → ∞ the averages (29) and (30) can be explicitly
performed by steepest descent. The result for the relevant quantities is
P = 1 (41)
Q = 1−
√
2
π
e−
λ2
2
λ
−
(
1− 1
λ2
)
erf
λ√
2
(42)
αχ
1 + χ
= (1− f)erf λ√
2
− f
√
2
π
λ (43)
with λ =
√
α/[1 + (1− f)Q+ f ]. The identity P = 1 implies that majority agents
use only one of their strategies, i.e. that the stationary state of a pure majority game
is in pure strategies. We define
c = (1− f)Q+ f (44)
Evidently, H can be expressed in terms of all saddle-point values since H/N = H .
Using (25) and taking the limit R→ −1 (this is equivalent to taking the limit β1 → β2
followed by β2 →∞) one easily finds
H =
1 + c
2(1 + χ)2
(45)
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Figure 2. Critical line separating the asymmetric, inefficient phase with H > 0
from the symmetric one with H = 0 in the (f, α) plane. As α ↓ αc(f), χ→∞.
The existence of a transition at some critical value of α is determined by the divergence
of χ (which means that H becomes 0). From (43) we find for αc the following
expression:
αc(f) = (1− f)erf(x) − 2fx√
π
(46)
where x is the solution of
2− (1− f)erf(x) − 1− f
x
√
π
e−x
2
+
f
x
√
π
= 0 (47)
Solving the above equations numerically for different f one obtains a very good
agreement with the behavior of H (see Fig. 1). The critical line αc calculated from
(46,47) is instead displayed in Fig. 2. It should be mentioned that an approximate
expression for σ2 can also be obtained, σ2 ≃ H + (1 − c)/2, but it is not as accurate
as the one for H . A better estimate of σ2 is obtained by solving the dynamics. As a
last remark, let us notice that for a pure majority game one gets, from (36–39) and
from the fact that 〈zm2〉2 =
√
2/π,
χ2 =
1
1 +
√
απ
and H = (1− χ2)−2 (48)
The expression for χ2 is identical to that of the Hopfield model at zero temperature.
4. Dynamics
Let us turn our attention to the dynamics. For simplicity, we concentrate on the
‘batch’ case [17], which is obtained by averaging (3) over the µ’s and re-scaling time.
This amounts to considering the case in which performance updates are made after
many (O(P )) iterations rather than at end of every round. This approximation has
already proved to be an extremely good one for minority games. One arrives at
yi(t+ 1)− yi(t) = ǫihi + ǫi
∑
j=1,N
Jijsj(t) (49)
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where hi = (2/
√
N)
∑
µ=1,P ξ
µ
i Ω
µ and Jij = (2/N)
∑
µ=1,P ξ
µ
i ξ
µ
j . The dynamical
partition function of (49) reads
Z[ψ] =
〈
ei
∑
it yi(t)ψi(t)
〉
paths
=
∫
ei
∑
it ŷi(t)[yi(t+1)−yi(t)−ǫihi−ǫi
∑
j Jijsj(t)−θi(t)]+yi(t)ψi(t)p(y(0))D(y, ŷ) (50)
where D(y, ŷ) =
∏
it[dyi(t)dŷi(t)/(2π)] and θi is a time-dependent external field.
In principle, disorder-averaged correlation and response functions can be calculated
exactly at all times by taking appropriate derivatives of the disorder-averaged Z, i.e.
Z[ψ] =
∫
ei
∑
it ŷi(t)[yi(t+1)−yi(t)−θi(t)]+yi(t)ψi(t)+NF (ŷ)p(y(0))D(y, ŷ) (51)
F (ŷ) =
1
N
log
[
e−i
∑
it ŷi(t)ǫi[hi+
∑
j Jijsj(t)]
]
(52)
with respect to the fields ψi and θi. We shall however be interested in the stationary
state only. As usual, evaluation of Z leads to an effective (non-Markovian) process
that provides an equivalent description of the original (Markovian) multi-agent process
(49). Such a calculation is in this case rather similar to that done for the pure batch
minority game in [17], and is sketched in the Appendix. The main difference is that
here we obtain two effective processes, describing trend-followers and fundamentalists
respectively. These are given by
y(t+ 1)− y(t) = αǫ
∑
t′
[(I+ G)−1]tt′s(t′) + θ(t) +
√
αz(t) (53)
where ǫ = 1 (resp. −1) for the majority (resp. minority) part, and z(t) is a zero-
average Gaussian random variable with temporal correlations
〈z(t)z(t′)〉 = [(I+ G)−1(E+ C)(I+ GT )−1]tt′ (54)
I stands for the identity matrix while E denotes the matrix with all elements equal to
one. C has elements Ctt′ = 〈s(t)s(t′)〉. G, instead (see Appendix for details), is the
sum of two contributions:
G = (1− f)G1 − fG2 (55)
G1 (resp. G2) has elements 〈∂s(t)/∂θ(t′)〉−1 (resp. 〈∂s(t)/∂θ(t′)〉+1) where the
subscript means average over the process (53) with ǫ = −1 (resp. +1). When N →∞,
Ctt′ can be identified with the disorder- and agent-averaged autocorrelation function
of (49), while the two components of Gtt′ become identical to the disorder- and agent-
averaged response functions of minority and majority agents, respectively.
Ergodic stationary states can be studied under the following assumptions:
• Time-translation invariance (TTI):
 limt→∞Ct+τ,t = C(τ)lim
t→∞
Gt+τ,t = G(τ)
;
• Finite integrated ‘response’ (FIR): limt→∞
∑
t′≤tGtt′ = χ <∞;
• Weak long-term memory (WLTM): limt→∞G(t, t′) = 0 ∀t′ finite.
The breakdown of any of these signals the breakdown of ergodicity. To be more clear,
we remark that the ‘integrated response’ χ defined in FIR has two components, i.e.,
with obvious notation,
χ = (1− f)χ1 − fχ2 (56)
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and can be negative. χ1 and χ2 are the actual susceptibilities of minority and majority
agents, respectively. With FIR, we will require that both χ1 and χ2 are finite.
As in the minority game, for individual agents there are two possibilities: either
yi(t)/t → constant 6= 0 as t → ∞, in which case they use only one of their strategies
asymptotically (we call these agents “frozen”); or yi(t)/t→ 0 as t→∞, in which case
they keep flipping between their strategies even in the long run (we call these agents
“fickle”). Macroscopic quantities can be obtained by separating the contributions of
frozen and fickle agents.
Defining y˜ = limt→∞ y(t)/t, s = limτ→∞(1/τ)
∑
t≤τ sign[y(t)/t] and z =
limτ→∞(1/τ)
∑
t≤τ z(t), one has that
y˜ =
αǫs
1 + χ
+
√
αz + θ =
√
αǫγs+
√
αz + θ (57)
Let us assume that γ > 0 (this assumption is verified a posteriori). For minority game
players (ǫ = −1), we have a frozen agent (with s = sign(y˜)) if |z| > γ and a fickle or
non-frozen agent (with s = z/γ) if |z| < γ [17]. In the majority part, all agents turn
out to be frozen. In particular, for z > γ agents freeze at s = 1, for z < −γ they
freeze at s = −1, while for |z| < γ they can freeze at either values of s. It follows
that the average autocorrelation c = limτ→∞ 1τ
∑
t≤τ C(t) is given by, separating the
contributions of minority agents from majority agents (〈 〉 = average over Gaussian r.v.
z with variance
〈
z2
〉
= limτ,τ ′→∞(ττ ′)−1
∑
t≤τ,t′≤τ ′ [(I + G)
−1(E + C)(I + GT )−1]tt′ =
(1 + χ)−2(1 + c)):
c = (1− f)
[
〈θ(|z| − γ)〉+
〈
θ(γ − |z|) z
γ
〉]
+ f
= (1− f)
[
1− erf λ√
2
+
1
λ2
(
erf
λ√
2
− λ
√
2
π
e−λ
2/2
)]
+ f (58)
where λ =
√
α
1+c . This agrees with the replica result (44). For the fraction φ of frozen
agents one obtains
φ = (1− f) 〈θ(|z| − γ)〉+ f = 1− (1− f)erf λ√
2
(59)
In Fig. 3 analytical results for c and φ are compared with simulations.
The ‘susceptibility’ (56) can instead be calculated from the formula
χ = (1− f) 〈sz〉min√
α 〈z2〉 − f
〈sz〉maj√
α 〈z2〉 (60)
which follows directly from the fact that response functions for minority
(resp. majority) agents can be obtained as†† α−1/2 〈∂sign[y(t)]/∂z(t′)〉−1 (resp.
α−1/2 〈∂sign[y(t)]/∂z(t′)〉+1), after an integration by parts and a time average [17].
The minority part is as usual given by
〈sz〉min = 〈θ(|z| − γ)|z|〉+
〈
θ(γ − |z|)z
2
γ
〉
=
1 + c√
α(1 + χ)
erf
λ√
2
(61)
††This is due to the fact that the noise term and the external field enter (53) in the same way, apart
from the
√
α factor.
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Figure 3. Persistent autocorrelation c (left) and fraction of frozen agents φ
(right) for various f . Lines correspond to the analytic solutions from (58) and
(59), markers are the results from numerical simulations. Vertical lines give, for
f < 1/2, the position of the critical points αc below which the stationary state
(hence c and φ) depends on initial conditions.
To calculate the majority part, one must fix the value of the product sz for−γ ≤ z ≤ γ,
where s can be either +1 or −1 (for |z| > γ one has sz = |z| in any case). In principle,
there are several possibilities. If one makes the ‘natural’ choice s = sign(z), then
〈sz〉maj = 〈|z|〉 =
√
2
π
√
1 + c
(1 + χ)2
(62)
This leads to
αχ
1 + χ
= (1− f)erf λ√
2
− fλ
√
2
π
(63)
χ diverges (hence FIR is violated and ergodicity is broken) when the fraction φ = 1−φ
of fickle agents satisfies φ = α + fλ
√
2/π or, equivalently, at the critical values of α
given by the equation
αc(f) = (1− f)erf(x) − 2fx√
π
(64)
where x is the solution of
2− (1− f)erf(x) − 1− f
x
√
π
e−x
2
+
f
x
√
π
= 0 (65)
(63–65) are in full agreement with the replica results of Sec. 3.
Another possibility is to calculate 〈sz〉maj without making any special assumption
on s for −γ ≤ z ≤ γ. This brings us to a situation where (62–64) are substituted
respectively by
〈sz〉maj = 〈θ(z + γ)z〉 − 〈θ(γ − z)z〉 = e−λ
2/2
√
2
π
√
1 + c
(1 + χ)2
(66)
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αχ
1 + χ
= (1− f)erf λ√
2
− fλ
√
2
π
e−λ
2/2 (67)
αc(f) = (1− f)erf(x)− 2fx√
π
e−x
2
(68)
where x now solves
2− (1− f)erf(x) − 1− 2f
x
√
π
e−x
2
= 0 (69)
The value of φ at which χ diverges is now φ = α + fλe−λ
2/2
√
2/π. Notice that the
extra exponential factor one obtains in this way does not change numerical results for
αc significantly (the solution of (65) is in fact . 0.3, so e
−x2 is always close to 1).
Notice also that for a purely majority game (recalling that χ2 = −χ) one gets for the
susceptibility
χ2 =
e−α/4/
√
απ
1 + e−α/4/
√
απ
(70)
instead of the Hopfield-like formula (48). In both cases, χ2 →∞ when α ↓ 0.
For the stationary volatility, which reads [17]
σ2 =
1
2
lim
t→∞[(I+ G)
−1(E+ C)(I+ GT )−1]tt (71)
one can use the approximate method of [17] to derive an expression in terms of the
persistent parameters χ and φ, which holds for α > αc:
σ2 =
1 + φ
2(1 + χ)2
+
1
2
(1 − φ) (72)
Solving for χ, φ and c for different f and substituting one obtains the volatility
branches displayed in Fig. 1, which are again in excellent agreement with simulations.
5. Summary and outlook
To summarize, we have studied the mixed majority-minority game with random
external information. Neglecting ‘retrieval’ (i.e. the possibility that trend-followers
flock in presence of a particular information pattern), we have first calculated the
stationary state of the dynamics from a static approximation via a negative-replica
theory. Then we have solved the dynamics using generating functional methods. The
two approaches match nicely and agree with numerical results for the macroscopic
observables σ2 and H in a satisfactory way. This suggests that retrieval does not
affect such quantities significantly. Our results also indicate that when fundamentalists
outnumber trend-followers, the macroscopic behavior of the system (‘phase transition’
with ergodicity breaking from an inefficient phase at high α to an efficient one at low
α) can be explained by the onset of anomalous response, that is by a divergence of
the integrated response, as in the pure minority game. We have calculated the line
of critical points in the (f, α) plane showing that the inefficient phase gets larger as
f increases. When trend-followers dominate, instead, the system is always inefficient
and low volatility states disappear. As a byproduct, we have provided an approximate
static and dynamical solution of the majority game. A greater effort is nevertheless
needed in order to incorporate the possibility of ‘herding’ in both the replica theory
and the path-integral solution. We expect retrieval states to exist at low α for any
f > 0. While such states shouldn’t affect global time-averaged properties (i.e. σ2
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and H) significantly, they are likely to play a most crucial role in such phenomena as
“bubbles”, that in our setting can be seen as localized in time. It is also likely that
RSB occurs at very low α for any f > 0, in pretty much the same way as RSB occurs
for any non-zero market impact in the pure minority game [21, 33, 34].
Let us finally remark two aspects of the present model that can be criticized
and hence improved. In first place, all players can in principle win at the same time
(i.e. the available resources are infinite), which is a clearly unrealistic situation (albeit
extremely unlikely in our disordered setup withN →∞). Secondly, in a market a large
buy rush today is justified by the belief that tomorrow the price will rise again so that
for instance one will be able to sell at a higher price. So in a majority game it would
perhaps be more correct to measure the effectiveness of a trading decision made today
by what the payoff will have been tomorrow [5, 6]. In other words, a player making a
trading decision ai(n) at round n should receive a payoff ui(n + 1) = ai(t)A(n + 1)
at round n + 1. Instead, in our model, his payoff is ui(n) = ai(n)A(n). In spite of
these limitations, we see that our model does indeed capture some of the features
one expects to find in markets where fundamentalists and trend-followers compete.
Also, we believe that some of the issues listed above, starting with retrieval, can be
taken into account, possibly with modest modifications. In our view, a possibly more
interesting generalization would consist in allowing the ǫi’s to be dynamical variables,
in order to give agents the possibility to change their character. Some work along
these lines is currently in progress.
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Appendix: Generating functional analysis
The disorder average is as usual expected to generate two-time player-averaged
functions of the si and ŷi variables only. We focus on
Ltt′ =
1
N
∑
i=1,N
ŷi(t)ŷi(t
′) (73)
Qtt′ =
1
N
∑
i=1,N
si(t)si(t
′) (74)
Ktt′ = − 1
N
∑
i=1,N
ǫisi(t)ŷi(t
′) (75)
The matrix K can be seen as formed by two components, for minority and majority
agents, respectively:
K = (1 − f)K1 − fK2 (76)
Forcing the above definitions inside Z via δ-functions with the proper N -scaling and
assuming that p(y(0)) =
∏
i=1,N p(yi(0)), we find (with the shorthand D(X, X̂) =
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tt′ dXtt′dX̂tt′/(2π))
Z[ψ] =
∫
eN(Ψ+Ω+Φ)D(Q, Q̂)D(L, L̂)D(K, K̂) (77)
where Ψ(Q, Q̂, L, L̂,K, K̂) = iTr[Q̂TQ+ L̂TL+ K̂TK],
Ω(Q̂, L̂, K̂) =
1
N
∑
i=1,N
log
∫
D(y, ŷ)p(y(0)) ei
∑
t ŷ(t)[y(t+1)−y(t)−θi(t)]+y(t)ψi(t) ×
×e−i
∑
tt′ [s(t)Q̂tt′ s(t
′)+ŷ(t)L̂tt′ ŷ(t
′)−ǫis(t)K̂tt′ ŷ(t′)] (78)
and Φ(Q, L,K) = F (ŷ). To calculate the latter, it suffices to make use of the definitions
of hi and Jij and to introduce, via δ-functions, the parameters
xµt =
√
2
N
∑
i=1,N
si(t)ξ
µ
i and w
µ
t = −
√
2
N
∑
i=1,N
ǫiŷi(t)ξ
µ
i (79)
It turns out that the relevant term for the disorder average is
ei
√
2
∑
tµ w
µ
t Ω
µ−i
√
2
N
∑
iµ ξ
µ
i
∑
t[x̂
µ
t si(t)−ŷi(t)ǫiŵµt ] =
= e−
1
2
∑
tt′µ(w
µ
t w
µ
t′
+ŵµt Ltt′ ŵ
µ
t′
+x̂µtQtt′ x̂
µ
t′
+2x̂µtKtt′ ŵ
µ
t′
) (80)
so that finally one has (with D(z, ẑ) =
∏
t dxtdx̂t/(2π))
Φ(Q, L,K) = α log
∫
D(x, x̂)D(w, ŵ)×
×ei
∑
t(xtx̂t+wtŵt+xtwt)− 12
∑
tt′ [wtwt′+ŵtLtt′ ŵ
µ
t′
+x̂tCtt′ x̂t′+2x̂tKtt′ ŵt′ ] (81)
where all integrals are from −∞ to +∞.
In the limit N → ∞ the dominant contribution to Z[ψ] comes from the saddle
point described by the equations
iQ̂tt′ = −∂Qtt′Φ iL̂tt′ = −∂Ltt′Φ iK̂tt′ = −∂Ktt′Φ (82)
Qtt′ = 〈s(t)s(t′)〉∗ Ltt′ = 〈ŷ(t)ŷ(t′)〉∗ Ktt′ = −〈ǫis(t)ŷ(t′)〉∗ (83)
where
〈h(s, y, ŷ)〉∗ =
1
N
∑
i=1,N
∫
h(s, y, ŷ)M ǫii (s, y, ŷ)D(y, ŷ)∫
M ǫii (s, y, ŷ)D(y, ŷ)
(84)
with
M ǫii (s, y, ŷ) = p(y(0)) e
i
∑
t ŷ(t)[y(t+1)−y(t)−θi(t)]+y(t)ψi(t) ×
×e−i
∑
tt′ [s(t)Q̂tt′ s(t
′)+ŷ(t)L̂tt′ ŷ(t
′)−ǫis(t)K̂tt′ ŷ(t′)] (85)
It can be checked by a direct calculation (e.g. following [17]) that, at the relevant
saddle point,
Qtt′ = Ctt′ ≡ 1
N
∑
i=1,N
〈si(t)si(t′)〉paths and Ltt′ = 0 (86)
As for Ktt′ , one can define −iK = G and see, for instance by taking the derivative of
〈si(t)〉paths with respect to θi(t′), that
G = (1− f)G1 − fG2 (87)
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where G1 is the response function of minority agents, with elements
G
(1)
tt′ =
1
N1
∑
i∈N1
∂
∂θi(t′)
〈si(t)〉paths (88)
and similarly G2 is the response function of majority agents.
Setting the generating field ψi to zero and assuming that θi(t) = θ(t), we can now
treat minority agents (ǫi = −1) and majority agents (ǫi = 1) separately. We get, for
Ω:
Ωǫ = log
∫
ei
∑
t ŷ(t)[y(t+1)−y(t)−θ(t)] ×
×e−i
∑
tt′ [s(t)Ĉtt′ s(t
′)+ŷ(t)L̂tt′ ŷ(t
′)−ǫs(t)K̂tt′ ŷ(t′)]p(y(0))D(y, ŷ) (89)
where we set Q̂ = Ĉ; the measure M ǫii instead becomes
M ǫ(s, y, ŷ) = p(y(0))e−i
∑
tt′ s(t)Ĉtt′ s(t
′) ×
×e−i
∑
tt′ ŷ(t)L̂tt′ ŷ(t
′)+i
∑
t ŷ(t)[y(t+1)−y(t)−θ(t)+ǫ
∑
t′ K̂
T
tt′
s(t)] (90)
M1 and M−1 represent majority and minority agents, respectively. The saddle-point
equations for Ĉ, L̂ and K̂ are identical to those found for the pure batch minority
game [17]. It results that
Ĉtt′ = 0
K̂Ttt′ = −α[(I− iK)−1]tt′ (91)
L̂tt′ = −1
2
iα[(I− iK)−1(E + C)(I− iKT )−1]tt′
where Itt′ = δtt′ and Ett′ = 1. Substituting these into M
ǫ one obtains
M ǫ(s, y, ŷ) = p(y(0))e−
1
2α
∑
tt′ ŷ(t)[(I−iK)−1(E+C)(I−iKT )−1]tt′ ŷ(t′) ×
×ei
∑
t ŷ(t)[y(t+1)−y(t)−θ(t)−αǫ
∑
t′ [(I−iK)−1]tt′s(t)] (92)
Recalling that K = iG, it turns out that the disorder-averaged correlation and response
functions for minority and majority agents are obtained as averages over the colored
effective stochastic processes (53) with ǫ = −1 and ǫ = 1, respectively.
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